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41 Introduction
One of the biggest research quests of our times 
is to fully understand the human brain and its 
mechanisms. New technologies have opened the 
doors to explore our mind, as for example by the 
use of virtual reality (VR). This technique is a 
powerful tool as it allows one to put the subjects
into situations that could hardly be done in real 
life, and to vary systematically parameters such 
as for example the visual properties of the virtual 
character or the external environment. Further-
on studies on spatial presence in virtual reality 
have shown that subjects tend to identify them-
selves with a virtual character in a VR environ-
ment (e.g. Sanchez-Vives and Slater [1]). This 
opens new possibilities to change the subject’s 
functional body (interaction between body and 
environment) without changing the real body.
In this experiment, we are mainly interested in 
bodily self perception and body ownership (self 
attribution of one’s body / body parts). It refers 
to the spatial perceptual status of one’s own 
body, which makes bodily sensations seem 
unique to oneself. Perception of the body is a 
multi-sensorial integration process where the 
brain has to integrate tactile, proprioceptive, vis-
ual and vestibular information in order to create 
a coherent representation of the body. This inte-
gration seems to depend on bottom-up (sensory 
input) as well as on top-down (representation of 
the body) processes [2]. Because neural integra-
tion of vision and touch may be essential for de-
veloping and maintaining this sense of bodily 
self, modifying their perception through VR is 
an interesting way to study the attribution of our 
sense of our own body [3].
2 Literature Review 
Many of the referenced articles point out a po-
tential, resulting from amalgamation of the use 
of virtual reality (VR) and the understanding of 
the self (e.g. Sanchez-Vives and Slater [1]). Espe-
cially the possibility to modify one's sensations 
in the VR environment can be very useful. The 
synthesis of these two domains might open a 
whole new set of research questions and psycho-
logical therapy techniques. As an example we 
can cite phobia treatment where VR is already 
used.
Until now, bodily self and ownership has mostly 
been studied in clinical patients (Blanke et al. [4]) 
Yet, some research has been done in healthy 
subjects using some body illusions. One such 
famous illusion is the rubber hand illusion which 
was first described by Botvinick and Cohen [5]. 
This illusion is created in the following way: the 
subject’s arm lies on a table but is hidden from 
his view. And then the experimenter strokes at 
the same time the hand of the subject and a visi-
ble fake hand. Usually, the subject will be taking 
the fake arm for his own arm. A hypothesis to 
explain this, is that the subject’s brain, seeing the 
stroked fake hand and feeling a stroking at ex-
actly the same time, thinks that these sensory in-
puts are coming from the same event. Different 
variations of the RHI experiment followed. For 
example Armel and Ramachandran [6] were in-
terested in how flexible the body schema is and 
tried the RHI, simply using the table for the fake 
hand, or putting the fake hand at an impossible 
position in comparison with the rest of the body, 
and they found that the illusion was still present. 
This led them to argue that the illusion arises 
mainly from the brain's ability to detect statistical 
correlations in sensory inputs to construct useful 
perceptual representations of the world (includ-
ing one's body). In addition, Tsakiris and Hag-
gard [7] showed that RHIs with tactile stimula-
tion led to a fragmented body awareness (stimu-
lating only one finger (of the fake and real hand), 
they obtained that only the stimulated fake fin-
ger was integrated in the body). Next, using this 
illusion, they investigated whether active and 
passive movements would lead to a similar 
fragmented body awareness, in order to see how 
motor agency in the voluntary control of body 
movements influences body awareness. They 
found that while purely proprioceptive sense of 
body-ownership is local and fragmented, the 
motor sense of agency integrates distinct body-
parts into a coherent, unified awareness of the 
body.
In another experiment, Tsakiris et al. [8] distin-
guish between the causes (i.e. multi-sensory 
stimulation) and the effect (i.e. the feeling of 
ownership) of the RHI. Using PET scan they 
identified brain areas whose activity was corre-
lated with a measure of body ownership (they 
found body ownership was related to activity in 
the right posterior insula and the right frontal 
operculum). A further example for the use of the 
RHI to study bodily cognition is given by 
Schütz-Bosbach et al. [9] who used it to manipu-
late the sense of body ownership in order to 
compare effects of observing actions that were 
illusorily attributed to the subject’s own body 
and actions that were not attributed to his body. 
They show that observing another’s actions fa-
cilitated the motor system, and that, in contrary, 
observing actions, which were illusorily attrib-
uted to the subject’s own body, showed the op-
posite pattern. They thus conclude that motor 
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whom the observed action is attributed. This re-
sult contradicts previous concepts of equivalence 
between one’s own actions and actions of others 
and suggests that social differentiation, not 
equivalence, is characteristic of the human action 
system.
For example, the observation of another’s action 
can selectively facilitate the brain’s motor circuit 
for the same action. A “mirror-matching mecha-
nism” might map observed actions onto the ob-
server’s own motor representations. Crucially, 
this view suggests that the brain integrates 
other’s actions like one’s own [9].
A different and very interesting approach to 
study the bodily self was done by Japanese phi-
losophers (Sato and Yasuda [10]) who investi-
gated by the mean of a Head-Mounted-Display
(HMD) long term effects of changing the per-
spective (seeing ones own body from a third 
perspective). They proposed that knowledge of 
motor commands is used to distinguish self-
generated sensation from externally generated 
sensation. They show that the sense of self-
agency largely depends on the degree of discrep-
ancy resulting from comparison between the 
predicted and actual sensory feedback. Their 
findings suggest that the senses of self-agency 
and self-ownership are mutually independent.
As we have seen, many experiments have been 
done using the RHI to get a better knowledge of 
body-ownership and sense of agency. However, 
there have been none using the whole body. As
the sense of body-ownership coming from the 
RHI is fragmented, we think that using the body 
as a whole for an experiment similar to the RHI 
could give a more complete sense of body-
ownership and some new interesting insights in 
bodily ownership mechanisms. This is the ques-
tion we propose to answer here, using virtual re-
ality to create the whole body illusion.
3 The present study
3.1 General purpose
The general aim of the study is to extend previ-
ous data on a whole body analogue of the rubber 
hand illusion, here called rubber body illusion 
(RBI) [11]. In this previous experiment under-
taken by Bigna Lenggenhager, the subjects were 
stroked on the back while standing still, and with 
the help of a camera and a head mounted display 
(HMD), they could simultaneously see them-
selves being stroked. If the illusion was present, 
they were tempted to identify themselves to the 
character seen in the HMD.
With our illusion, we try to systematically disen-
tangle the influences of visual, somatosensory 
and motor components on bodily self percep-
tion such as the sense of ownership, the sense of 
agency and spatial presence for the whole body.
The use of a tracking system has several advan-
tages compared to previous setups of rubber
hand and preparatory whole body illusion ex-
periments described above. Mainly, we can easily 
control the time lag, measure more precisely the 
distance between the subject and the virtual 
character and also be able to localize the stroking 
and the spatial location of the subject. It also 
gives other possibilities which we will not use in 
our experience, but that will be very useful for
further research at the LNCO: size, position, 
view etc. of the displayed virtual character and 
environment can be modified with ease, or dis-
turbing effects such as mirrored, exaggerated 
movements could also be added. 
The main question is “to what extent the subject 
attributes the virtual body to his own body and 
how does this influence the self localization of 
ones own body”. If the experiments work, we 
would ideally be able to measure which inter-
modal (visual - somatosensory, visual-
active/passive motor) correlations are more 
relevant for the self-identification. This would 
have important implications for scientific expla-
nations of different concepts such as embodi-
ment or spatial presence; but also for clinical 
phenomena such as autoscopic phenomena.
3.2 Experiment A: Stroking
This experiment is the modification to the whole 
body of the rubber hand illusion experiment. 
The subject stands straight, without moving, 
within the limits of the tracking frame. A second 
person strokes the subject in the upper part of 
his back using a stick (brush). The subject looks 
at a life size virtual character, shown from a back 
view, distant of two meters in front of him. The 
stroking was tracked (the stick has sensors on it 
so that the tracking frame knows exactly its posi-
tion and orientation) and could then be pro-
jected in real-time on the back of the virtual 
character. Two conditions were tested here: (1) 
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with the real one (except the very small time lag 
of the equipment), (2) the stroking is asynchro-
nous (i.e. a recorded stroking is shown while the 
subject is being stroked totally differently). In 
the synchronous condition, the subject should 
ideally identify himself to the virtual character. 
3.3 Experiment B : Swaying
This experiment invokes whole body move-
ments thus adding a motor / agency compo-
nent. The measurement methods were the same 
as for experiment A (see below for the descrip-
tion of the measurement methods), even if we 
discussed interesting other measurement meth-
ods that we did not test. The reason is obviously 
that keeping the same measurement method al-
lows us to compare the relative degree of identi-
fication between the two experiments. The sub-
ject was asked to perform a simple and basic 
movement, swaying irregularly from left to right 
and vice versa. In the synchronous condition, 
the subject’s movement was projected on the 
virtual character (without time delay) and in the 
asynchronous condition, a previously recorded 
motion of the virtual character was projected, 
similarly to experiment A.
3.4 Hypothesis
When the virtual character is stroked (exp A) or 
moves (exp B) synchronously (without time-lag) 
a higher degree of identification is expected to 
be measureable than in the case where the strok-
ing / moving seen on the virtual character is
asynchronous with respect to the subject. We 
also hypothesize that the identification / attribu-
tion is stronger when an active component (Ex-
periment B) is involved. This condition should 
allow us to point out the importance of this self-
agency inhibiting effect.
Conditions
Synchrony (1) Asynchrony (2)
Somatosensory
input (A) A1 / 1 A2 / 2
E
xperim
ents
Body movement
(B) B1 / 3 B2 / 4
Figure 1:  Listing of experiments and conditions
Subject No: …carries out: …in other words:
1 A1 A2 B1 B2 1 2 3 4
2 A1 A2 B2 B1 1 2 4 3
3 A2 A1 B1 B2 2 1 3 4
4 A2 A1 B2 B1 2 1 4 3
5 B1 B2 A1 A2 3 4 1 2
6 B1 B2 A2 A1 3 4 2 1
7 B2 B1 A1 A2 4 3 1 2
8 B2 B1 A2 A1 4 3 2 1
Figure 2:  Proceeding protocol for the first part. The different conditions correspond to the letters (A1, 
A2, B1, B2) are described in the Figure 1
7Subject No: …carries out:
2 B2 – C B1 – L A2 – L A1 – C
3 B2 – L B1 – C A1 – L A2 – C
4 B1 – L B2 – C A1 – C A2 – L
5 A1 – C A2 – L B2 – L B1 – C
6 A2 – C A1 – L B2 – C B1 – L
7 A1 – L A2 – C B1 – C B2 – C
8 A2 – C A1 – L B1 – L B2 – L
Figure 3: Proceeding protocol for the part with EDA measurement. Note that we could not measure the 
EDA for subject 1. The letters A1, A2, B1 and B2 are described in Figure 1. “L” corre-
sponds to the falling of the lamp and “C” of the column.
4 Method and Experiments
4.1 Subjects
8 subjects, all students, right handed male or fe-
male (4 of each) between the age of 18 and 30
years, took part to the experiment. With these
inclusion criteria we tried to exclude misleading 
results due to potential differences from educa-
tion, ambidexterity and age. 
All subjects were “naïve” to the exact aim of the 
study. The cover-story will be a qualitative test 
of immersion in a newly developed program of 
virtual reality. Cognitive Psychology was not 
mentioned at any time.
4.2 Material
4.2.1 Hardware
We used the ATC ReActor2 motion capture sys-
tem, which consists of a network of infra-red 
light emitting markers and infra-red light sensing 
detectors contained in an open-sided rectangular 
frame made of aluminium extrusion. For more 
specific information please refer to reference 
[12]. 
We used screen retro-projection rather than 
HMD glasses.
In both experiments the subject wears a black 
“Velcro-suit” with 20 sensors attached to track 
his movements (the ReActor system detects the 
positions of all the sensors and sends it to the 
software). After doing some pre-tests on our-
selves, we found that 20 sensors were sufficient 
for the needed movements of the character to 
seem natural. There was also a brush available 
with two additional sensors for experiment A.
EDA (Electro-Dermal Activity) has been meas-
ured with an EEG (Electro Encephalo Gram, 
Biosemi) system. 
4.2.2 Software
ReActor FusionCORE software allowed us to 
treat the data collected by the motion capture 
system and send it to Motion Builder software. 
The Motion Builder software then created the 
3D environment for the virtual character that 
was projected on the big screen.
Photo 1. Motion builder software that was
used. The room and character are the ones 
presented in our experiments
4.3 Experimental setup
First the subject had to be prepared. He had to 
put on the “Velcro-suit” and then all the sensors 
had to be placed on the subject. Then, the well
working of all sensors had to be verified and we 
needed to ensure that everything was fine with 
the ReActor Systems. After that, the virtual body 
on the Motion Builder software could be re-
scaled to fit for each subject. Instructions about 
the experience were then given to the subject.
During the experiments, the subjects also had to 
listen to an mp3 player playing some white noise, 
so that he/she was not disturbed by external 
noises.
84.4 Procedure
First, each subject got two documents to read,
informing them that the experiments are not 
harmful and that no known long-term side ef-
fects are reported. A written consent from the 
subject to participate in the experiment was also 
asked. Second, a questionnaire to verify that they 
are really right handed people had to be filled 
out. 
The experiences then began. We first did 3 con-
trol condition measurements for the shift (i.e. 
the subject was placed at a fixed position, then 
we asked him to close his eyes and moved him 
by 1 meter to the back, and then 1 meter to the 
right or the to the left. After that, we asked him 
to go back to where he thinks he initially was 
(eyes closed), and finally we measured where he 
went with respect to his initial position (more 
explanations about this displacement are given 
below).
Next we started with one of the condition (alter-
nating the order for the different subjects, to 
avoid order effects, see figure 2). The experi-
ment (one condition) lasted about 1 minute and 
was followed by a shift-measurement (see 
“Measurements” for explanations). This proce-
dure was repeated for the three next experi-
ments. After having accomplished the 4 condi-
tions, we repeated three times a control shift 
measurement in order to see if the subject was
reasonably constant or if he went back to totally 
arbitrary positions.
Photo 2. Subject being stroked and seeing the 
stroking on the screen.
Then the subject had to fill out questionnaires 
on these four experiments and once the ques-
tionnaires were filled out, we did again the four 
experiences in another order, to measure the fear 
response using the EDA (see below). No shift 
measurements were performed this time (see 
figure 3 for the order of these conditions). Fi-
nally, personality questionnaire had to be filled 
out.
The complete experiment took about 1h15 to 
1h45 minutes.
4.5 Measurements
4.5.1 Shift measurement
According to the Triangle Path Completion
(TPC) the subject was moved 1 meter to the 
back and then 1 meter to the right or the left,
doing small steps in order to prevent the subject 
from keeping track of the displacement. He then 
had to go back to where he thought his initial 
position was (eyes closed). We then measured
the shift between his position and the original 
one (separately in the left-right and back-forward 
directions). The hypothesis is that if the illusion 
is present, the subject should feel attracted to the 
virtual character and a forward shift should be 
present (the projected character will be right in 
front of him, so there should moreover not be 
any left-right shift).
4.5.2 EDA measurement (fear reaction)
To have more means to measure the intensity of 
the illusion, a second part of the experiment has 
been to repeat the same conditions, with a dif-
ferent measurement method. EDA (also known 
as galvanic skin response) is a method to meas-
ure the electrical resistance of the skin. This 
measure has been used to detect a higher activity 
of the sweat glands, produced by any emotion. 
Two captors are set on one side of the hand, on 
specific points corresponding to yellow and red 
zones (see figure 4) and a second pair of captor 
is set on the other, at less specific places, as con-
trol signal.
Figure 4: the position of the captors
for the EDA
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fear response in the following way: after 1 min-
ute of the experiment, a virtual object that was 
already present on the screen suddenly fell on 
the subject. We programmed two such objects: a 
standing lamp and a column, and used alterna-
tively the falling of the one or the other. We re-
corded the subject’s electro-dermal activity in 
order to obtain an intensity measure of his fear 
response.
The hypothesis here is that if the illusion is pre-
sent, the subject, identifying himself to the VR 
character, should be more afraid than if there is 
no illusion, i.e. we should detect a greater effect 
in the synchronous condition than the asyn-
chronous one.
Photo 3. The subject is ready for the EDA 
measurement.
4.6 Questionnaires
After the first series of experiments followed by 
the shift measurements, the subjects filled out a 
first set of questionnaires, one for each condi-
tion, in order to obtain information about the 
subject’s feelings during the experiments. The 
questionnaires were quite similar to the ones
used by Bigna Lenggenhager in preceding pre-
paratory experiments. 
In this first set of questionnaires, the subjects 
were asked to remember the four situations and 
answer according to the feelings they had during 
each one of them, indicating first the intensity of 
the described feeling on a scale from 0 to 100 
with an interval of 10, and secondly indicating if 
this felt intensity was present during the whole 
part of the experiment (one condition) or not, 
similarly indicating the percentage on a time 
scale from 0 to 100 with an interval of 10. To 
give an example, a question could be answered 
saying: “Yes I felt the suggested feeling as it is 
written in question number # with an intensity 
of 80, but I only felt it towards the end, let’s say 
in the last third of the two minutes lasting ex-
periment.” So they would have indicated the lat-
ter statement with 30 points on the time scale. 
For all questionnaires, there was a “free com-
ments” section given at the end, so that they 
could express themselves on strange feelings that 
they possibly experienced and which would not 
have been addressed within the questions.
Finally, after measuring EDA, a last set of ques-
tionnaires about the subject’s personality had to 
be filled out. These two additional question-
naires which are commonly used in clinical tests 
are called “Perceptual Aberration Scale” (PAS) 
questionnaire and “Dissociative Identity Scale”
(DIS) questionnaire respectively. 
These last questionnaires permitted to know if 
subjects had particularities that could influence 
on our experiments and to check it if they had
really different results comparing to the other 
subjects.
In order to determine whether our subjects were 
“normal subjects” we had them fill out the PAS 
questionnaire, which measures the subject’s per-
ceptual skills or, more precisely, the aberrations 
of their perceptual skills compared to established 
norms. These norms are based on the Chapman 
et al. Psychosis-Proneness Scales for Caucasian 
undergraduate students in Introductory Psychol-
ogy courses at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison [13]. Jean and Loren Chapman and 
their students gathered these norms and the 
item-data (reported on each scale) on their 
NIMH – supported research project at the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin-Madison in the 1980's. 
Their tables provide separate norms for males 
and females.
All questionnaires as well as the handed out in-
formation sheet are given in the appendix.
4.7 Protocol / Scripts (Summary of the 
procedure)
We precisely described each experience to the 
subjects with the same explanation to be sure to 
have no inequalities in the results due to mis-
matches in the explanation of the execution of 
the experience.
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In order to keep the subjects as naïve as possible 
throughout the experiences, we avoided to tell 
them about the ultimate goal of the study. Cog-
nitive psychology was never mentioned. We fo-
cused our explanations on software synchroniza-
tion process developments for virtual reality 
studies. As soon as the subject arrived, he or she 
was given the info-and written consent sheet and 
the right-hander questionnaire. We started then 
to dress up the subject, calibrated the sensors 
and got the software ready. As this process was 
new and quite interesting for the subjects, they 
did not really have the time to think about asking 
questions about the experience which could have 
brought us into annoying situations… 
The subject was then taught about the displace-
ment procedure: as soon as the sequences on the 
screen were finished they should close their eyes 
and begin to make small steps in place. Then 
they would be guided in the displacement by 
having us taking them by the shoulders. And af-
ter letting them go, they should try to go back to 
the same location as they initially were.
They were then told that, in order to see how 
this should work, we should first train the dis-
placement procedure three times. Having done 
these three control displacements, they were 
taught about the task for the following 1 to 2 
minutes lasting sequence, which was either the 
stroking or the swaying task. For each condition 
they were asked to focus their concentration on 
what was happening on the screen and their feel-
ing about it. After the experiments we asked 
them to repeat the displacement measure three 
more times in order to detect any changes. They 
were then invited to fill out the first set of ques-
tionnaires, before going on with the same four 
experiments without displacement, but with 
EDA measurements.
Photo 4. The lamp has suddenly fallen on the subject to 
measure his fear reaction.
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5 Results
5.1 Shift
After collecting the results from the shifts of the 
subjects, the values have been averaged in order 
to continue the analysis of the data.
We first checked that the subjects did not get 
better at replacement along trials; the three con-
trols before and after the experience did not lead 
to a significant difference (p > 0.5). This allowed 
us to use the average of the control shifts as 
general control condition and use them as refer-
ence for our statistical tests.
In our study, we were most interested in the re-
sults about anterior shift; however the data on 
lateral shift also yielded some interesting results. 
It can be seen on the histograms with the indi-
vidual data (figures 5 and 6) that most of the 
subjects (1,2,4,6,7,8) experienced an anterior ef-
fect during the synchronous stroke condition but 
not during the asynchronous condition. Surpris-
ingly most subjects showed an opposite effect 
during the swaying condition.
Figure 5: Relative displacement for 
stroking.
Figure 6: Relative displacement for 
swaying.
A 2x2 ANOVA with the within subjects factors 
([stroking/swaying] VS [sync/async]) revealed a 
significant interaction effect between the two 
conditions (p-value: 0.033). This allowed us to 
do the following dependant sample t-tests.
Figure 7: Average shift for stroking 
and swaying.
We can clearly see on the averaged histograms
(figure 7) a strong difference of means between 
the synchronous and asynchronous stroke and 
also between the synchronous stroke and sway. 
Dependent t-tests demonstrated a significant dif-
ference between the synchronous stroking and 
swaying conditions. This was not the expected 
results but this is still really interesting and will 
be further studied in the discussion section.  
Concerning asynchronous and synchronous 
stroke, the t-test showed no significant differ-
ence (p-value: 0.148). The t-test also surprisingly 
showed an almost significant difference between 
the synchronous and asynchronous swaying
condition (p-value: 0.058) 
We also did a one sample t-test (against 0, which 
is in our case the motor control condition as we
are using the relative shifts). We obtained as ex-
pected a significant effect of the synchronous 
stroke condition (p-value: 0.039).
We also looked at the lateral shift for the control 
conditions. We remarked that in the longitudinal 
control displacement, the subjects showed a 
negative mean. Meaning that instead of stopping 
at their initial point, they were stopping 16.61 cm 
before it. We wanted to determine if this shift 
was reproduced in the lateral displacement. So 
we averaged the left and right control conditions 
separately (remember that the subjects were dis-
placed from 1 meter backward and 1 meter left 
or right). We obtained the expected results; 
when they were displaced to the left, they 
stopped 15.96 cm before the initial point and 
17.875 cm when they were displaced to the right. 
We can see this displacement graphically on the 
figure 8.
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We effectuated t-tests to see if the difference be-
tween left and right displacement was really sig-
nificant and a significant effect was indeed seen 
(p-value: 0.045). This drift is really interesting 
and is also concordant with the results Bigna 
Lenggenhager obtained in her experience.
We also noticed a curious effect; during the ex-
periment, the subjects experienced an 8 cm right 
shift, meaning that, in average, they went back 8 
cm more right than the initial starting point. This 
should have been equilibrated by the alternate 
left/right displacements but it did not. We ran a 
one sample t-test against the 0 motor control 
condition and obtained a significant effect (p-
value: 0.044). This is interesting as Bigna Leng-
genhager noticed the same right shift during 
both of her experience and did not find any clear 
explanation. Some hypothesis will be discussed 
in the discussion section.
Figure 8: Displacement of the subjects: the subjects usually come back to their initial point out of the red 
zone during control and go in this zone and further during experiments.
5.2 EDA
For the EDA measurement, we obtained the 
curves shown in Figure 9 and 11. Given that the 
EDA method returns the resistance of the skin, 
the plots here represent the inverse value of 
EDA, the conductance (in Siemens).
The analyses done on those plots are mainly vis-
ual. The first global observation which can be 
done is the higher variability on the whole signal 
of the swaying condition compared to the strok-
ing condition. This is due to the reactivity of the 
EDA system to the movements of the subject 
(which leads to this “wave appearance” on the 
second figure). Considering this, fewer observa-
tions are naturally done on the swaying condi-
tion, which can only show a trend, mainly with 
subjects 1, 2 and 6.
In the stroking condition, subjects 1, 2 and 5 ap-
pear to have the desired trend – a reaction just 
after the fall of the object. This difference is 
about 2*10-7 Siemens and looking at the men-
tioned subjects in the swaying condition shows 
that this value is also approximately the same.
Given the very low difference of values in our 
experiment, no conclusion can really directly be 
made about the reaction of the subjects. Never-
theless, we believe that this perceptually observ-
able difference indicates that something effec-
tively happened, but has surely been decreased 
by different factors that appeared in our proce-
dure.
In addition to the movement in the swaying 
condition, another source of noise in our data 
could be an effect that we observed for the dif-
ferent subjects; some of them happened to laugh 
during one or another condition, which shows 
that the subjects were maybe not sufficiently 
immersed in the scene, and maybe that the pres-
ence of an experimenter next to him during the 
stroking increased this.
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Figure 9: EDA recording per subject 
in the stroking condition
The figures above confirmed a trend towards 
our hypothesis and we needed some more analy-
sis. An ANOVA has been done for the signals 
normalized for each subject and we got the fig-
ure 10, showing the same effects, mainly in the 
swaying condition (Note: one subject is missing 
in asynchronous swaying condition due to a 
problem with the EDA measurements). These 
results were confirmed by the average of these 
values, shown in figure 12. The final results 
showed a significant effect only in swaying con-
dition between synchronous and asynchronous 
condition.
Figure 10: Normalized EDA signal 
for each subject after falling 
of the object
Figure 11: EDA recording per sub-
ject in the swaying condition
Figure 12: Average of the normalized 
signal values
5.3 Questionnaires
5.3.1 Questionnaires 1-4:
On figure 13, four histograms of the mean and 
weighted mean intensities according to the de-
scribed feelings for each question are repre-
sented. Each graph compares the synchronous 
versus the asynchronous condition. The 
weighted means were calculated taking the time 
scale value as weighting coefficients, and thus 
multiplying the latter with the intensity values. 
The error bars (standard deviations) are of 
course symmetric. For graphical simplicity only 
the upper part of the error bar is shown. 
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Figure 13: Histograms of the mean and weighted mean intensities according to the described feelings for 
each question.
Questions 1 to 9, and 19 to 26 were the following (French version only):
Durant l’expérience, il y a eu certaines fois où:
1 Il m’a semblé que je sentais le toucher du bâton à l’emplacement où je regardais le corps virtuel en train d’être touché.
2 Il m’a semblé que le toucher que je sentais était dû au bâton touchant le corps virtuel.
3 J’ai eu l’impression que le corps virtuel était mon propre corps.
4 Il m’a semblé que ma conception des couleurs changeait au cours de l’expérience.
5 J’ai eu l’impression que mon corps (réel) se déplaçait (comme aspiré) vers l’avant (en direction du corps virtuel).
6 Il m’a semblé avoir plus d’un corps.
7 Il m’a semblé que le toucher que je sentais venait de quelque part entre mon propre corps et le corps virtuel.
8 J’ai eu l’impression que la taille du corps virtuel correspondait approximativement à la mienne.
9 Il semblait que le corps virtuel se déplaçait (comme aspiré) vers l’arrière (en direction de mon corps).
19 Il m’a semblé que les mouvements que le corps virtuel exécutait étaient mes mouvements.
20 J’ai eu l’impression que le corps virtuel était mon propre corps.
21 Il m’a semblé que ma conception des couleurs changeait au cours de l’expérience.
22 J’ai eu l’impression que mon corps (réel) se déplaçait (comme aspiré) vers l’avant (en direction du corps virtuel).
23 Il m’a semblé avoir plus d’un corps.
24 Il m’a semblé percevoir mes mouvements quelque part entre mon propre corps et le corps virtuel.
25 J’ai eu l’impression que la taille du corps virtuel correspondait approximativement à la mienne.
26 Il me semblait que le corps virtuel se déplaçait (comme aspiré) vers l’arrière (en direction de mon corps).
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Of the above questions, number 1-3 and 19-20 
were most interesting to test our main hypothe-
sis, meaning that they represent most the poten-
tial effects that we wanted to observe. Note that 
these are the questions (modified) according to 
our experience that Botvinick [5] found to be 
positively answered.
5.3.1.1 Stroking (A1, A2):
We can clearly see that there is an effect that 
goes in the direction of our assumption, namely 
that the subjects identify themselves more with 
the virtual character in the synchronous condi-
tion than in the asynchronous one (graph (a), Q 
1-3). But only question 1 is actually significant 
(paired Student test, p<0.05). Question number 
3 shows a trend (p<0.1). This might mainly be 
due to the small number of subjects tested. Nev-
ertheless, being the “strongest” question in the 
sense of our hypothesis, question number 3 visi-
bly shows that if there was a forwards shift 
measured, it would most possibly be due to a 
confusion of the subject’s sense of ownership. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that there 
was a difference (trend, p<0.1) between male 
and female subjects for this question. In the 
synchronous condition, the mean intensity of 
female subjects was much higher than the male 
subject’s mean intensity, whereas in the asyn-
chronous condition we observed the opposite 
pattern.
Questions 4 and 8 were control questions, where 
we expected a small score for question 4 but a 
high score for question 8, both without differ-
ence between synchronous and asynchronous 
condition. The subject’s answers did clearly 
match our expectations for the stroking as well 
as for the swaying task.
5.3.1.2 Swaying (B1, B2):
We get a significant difference (p<0.05) for the 
synchronous versus the asynchronous condition 
for question number 19, which states that the 
subjects did clearly distinguish between a charac-
ter performing the subject’s movements and a 
character that did not. Question 20 also shows a 
trend (p<0.1) but only when the intensity values 
are weighted. However, this means that the sub-
jects did identify themselves more with the vir-
tual character in the synchronous condition than 
in the asynchronous condition. Similarly to the 
stroking task and the difference between male 
and female subjects, the swaying task showed 
again a large disparity between male and female 
subject’s feelings on question 20, but this time 
male subject’s showed up to identify themselves 
quite stronger to the virtual character than did 
female subjects. If yes or no this observation 
yields an intrinsic difference in the sense of 
ownership or sense of agency between male and 
female subjects according to the nature of the 
task to fulfil, might be worthy to investigate 
more profoundly in further studies.
Questions 21 and 25 were again control ques-
tions and as before, they do not show any differ-
ence as expected. 
Note that question number 26 (equivalent to 
question number 9) did show a slight (not sig-
nificant) difference for the swaying task. Indeed 
we observed that some subjects had the ten-
dency to slightly step forwards while doing the 
swaying, i.e. while changing from one foot to the 
other. Whether it was the feeling of being as-
pired forwards which made them actually step 
forwards or it was the fact that they stepped 
forwards which made them feel as if they were 
aspired forwards, we unfortunately cannot re-
port. Yet, the fact that they were stepping for-
ward during the experiment was something we 
could hardly control and which made measure-
ments more difficult, and future experiments 
should therefore take into account such side ef-
fects and try to avoid it.
5.3.2 Questionnaire 5 - The Perceptual Aberreation 
Scale (PAS)
On figure 14 the PAS scores are given. The first 
two columns provide the data for males and the 
third and fourth columns provide the same data 
for females. The p data were obtained from col-
lege students enrolled in the introductory psy-
chology classes at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison. The fields are coloured whenever our 
scores are higher than the Chapman means for 
each question individually.
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n = 775 n = 4 n = 840 n = 4 N =  1615 N = 8
  p   p   p   p   p   p
0.22 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.19 0.00 T 1 Sometimes I have had feelings that I am united with an object near me.
0.20 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.23 0.25 T 2 I have sometimes had the feeling that one of my arms or legs is disconnected from the rest of my body.
0.10 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.13 0.00 T 3 I sometimes have to touch myself to make sure I’m still there.
0.23 0.25 0.17 0.25 0.20 0.25 T 4 Sometimes part of my body has seemed smaller than it usually is.
0.15 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.16 0.00 T 5 At times I have wondered if my body was really my own.
0.20 0.00 0.19 0.25 0.19 0.13 T 6 Parts of my body occasionally seem dead or unreal.
0.11 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.10 0.00 T 7 Sometimes I have had a passing thought that some part of my body was rotting away.
0.10 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.00 T 8 Occasionally I have felt as though my body did not exist.
0.05 0.00 0.03 0.25 0.04 0.13 T 9 Sometimes I have felt that I could not distinguish my body from other objects around me.
0.18 0.25 0.15 0.25 0.16 0.25 T 10 It has seemed at times as if my body was melting into my surroundings.
0.38 0.25 0.34 0.50 0.36 0.38 F 11 I have never felt that my arms or legs have momentarily grown in size.
0.30 0.25 0.31 0.25 0.31 0.25 F 12 The boundaries of my body always seem clear.
0.09 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.00 T 13 I can remember when it seemed as though one of my limbs took on an unusual shape.
0.30 0.25 0.32 0.25 0.31 0.25 T 14 I sometimes have had the feeling that my body is abnormal.
0.14 0.00 0.14 0.25 0.14 0.13 T 15 I have sometimes had the feeling that my body is decaying inside.
0.07 0.00 0.04 0.25 0.05 0.13 T 16 I have had the momentary feeling that the things I touch remain attached to my body.
0.08 0.00 0.08 0.25 0.08 0.13 T 17 Occasionally it has seemed as if my body had taken on the appearance of another person’s body.
0.28 0.25 0.22 0.50 0.25 0.38 T 18 Sometimes I feel like everything around me is tilting.
0.11 0.00 0.09 0.50 0.10 0.25 T 19 Ordinary colors sometimes seem much too bright to me.
0.20 0.00 0.17 0.25 0.18 0.13 F 20 My hands or feet have never seemed far away.
0.09 0.00 0.09 0.50 0.09 0.25 T 21 I have sometimes felt that some part of my body no longer belongs to me.
0.10 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.00 T 22 I have felt that something outside my body was a part of my body.
0.21 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.25 T 23 I have felt that my body and another person's body were one and the same.
0.49 0.25 0.54 0.75 0.52 0.50 T 24 Now and then, when I look in the mirror, my face seems quite different than usual.
0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 T 25 I have felt as though my head or limbs were somehow not my own.
0.22 0.25 0.17 0.25 0.19 0.25 T 26 Sometimes when I look at things like tables and chairs, they seem strange.
0.27 0.25 0.20 0.25 0.23 0.25 F 27 I have never had the passing feeling that my arms or legs have become longer than usual.
0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 T 28 I sometimes have had the feeling that some parts of my body are not attached to the same person.
Total     Females       Males
Figure 14: On each list of items, p = the proportion of subjects who answered in the keyed direction, that 
is, in the direction of a high, or pathological sense; p = idem for our eight subjects (every second 
column). The T or F by each item indicates whether a True or False answer is in the pathologi-
cal direction. 
On figure 15 a histogram comparing overall 
mean scores is shown. Obviously our male sub-
jects have a lower perceptual aberration mean 
than norm. However, due to the small number 
of subjects we cannot say anything about statisti-
cal significance.
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Male subjects Female subjects
M
ea
n
Chapman norms
NC African American
NC Caucausian
WI Caucausian
Our results
Figure 15: Perceptual Aberration Scale. Comparison to Chapman norm values. Error bars represent 
standard deviations. NC African American = norms based upon African American college 
students at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Winston-Salem State University, 
and North Carolina A&T State University. NC Caucasian = norms based upon Caucasian 
college students at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. WI Caucasian = norms 
based upon Caucasian college students at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
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All norm values do exclude about 19 “cutoff 
scores”, scores which are 1.96 standard devia-
tions above the mean. Subjects are considered 
deviant on a particular measure if their score is 
equal to or greater than the cutoff score. There 
are no cutoff scores within our subject’s scores. 
Yet, since scores may vary with age, SES, and 
ethnicity, the applicability of these norms should 
be considered carefully.
5.3.3 Questionnaire 6 – Dissociative Identity Scale 
(DIS)
The last questionnaire enables us to compare 
Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) scores of 
our subjects with norm values from dissociative 
experience scale scores in the general population 
in the city of Winnipeg, Canada. The higher the 
DES score, the more likely it is that the person 
suffers from DID. In a sample of 1’051 clinical 
subjects, however, only 17% of those scoring 
above 30 on the DES actually had DID. In most 
studies the average DES score for a DID posi-
tive patient is in the 40s, and the standard devia-
tion about 20, roughly about 15% of clinically 
diagnosed DID patients score below 20 on the 
DES. It has been shown that the DES can actu-
ally predict who will not, and who may have a 
dissociative disorder with high accuracy. The av-
erage DES score usually lies between 10.0 and 
20.0.
In figure 16 the individual and mean DIS scores
of our subjects, as well as the “DID positive”
threshold value are represented. We observe an 
overall mean score of 20, which is representative 
for general population. However, this mean 
score has been achieved with quite disparate in-
dividual scores, meaning that 3 subjects had 
rather very low scores (below 5) and two other 
subjects had rather high scores (above 35).
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Figure 16: DID scores for 8 subjects. Only the upper part of the error bars is shown.
The distribution of “dissociative experiences” in 
the general population closely resembles that in 
college students, except that students are 
younger and do not manifest the slight decline in 
DES score that occurs with age; the findings are 
consistent across many studies and in a variety 
of different cultures and languages. In general, 
most people do not report any pathological dis-
sociative experiences. Moreover, many dissocia-
tive experiences are normal and benign, and ex-
trapolations from self-report data set the lifetime 
prevalence of dissociative disorders in the gen-
eral population in the range of 2% to 11%.
The items in figure 17 are ranked from the high-
est to the lowest average score: the possible 
score for each item ranges from 0 to 100, de-
pending on how frequently one has the given 
experience. The overall DES score is the sum of 
the 28-item scores divided by 28, and therefore 
also ranges from 0 to 100. The second and fifth 
column are the frequency of endorsement of 
each item, or the prevalence: This is the percent-
age of respondents scoring above zero for that 
item. The third and sixth column is the percent-
age of respondents who experience this item 
with a score above 30: This threshold value of 
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30 has been chosen because it is regarded as a 
threshold score for the pathological range by 
many investigators. The full questionnaire is 
given in the annexe.
Mean Prevalence
Subjects 
Scoring Mean Prevalence
Subjects 
Scoring
Score % > 30 (%) Score % > 30 (%)
Able to ignore pain 25.6 74.7 33.4 17.5 50.0 25.0
Missing part of a conversation 24.3 83.0 29.0 48.8 100.0 62.5
Usually difficult things can be done with ease and
spontaneity 22.8 73.1 28.4 30.0 75.0 50.0
Not sure whether one has done something or only 
thought about it 21.2 73.1 24.7 41.3 75.0 50.0
Absorption in television program or movie 20.2 63.9 24.2 38.8 75.0 50.0
Remembering past so vividly one seems to be
reliving it 17.4 60.4 19.2 37.5 75.0 37.5
Staring into space 15.3 62.6 25.7 36.3 87.5 50.0
Talking out loud to oneself when alone 15.2 55.6 17.7 18.8 50.0 25.0
Finding evidence of having done things one can't
remember doing 13.5 58.4 14.3 27.5 37.5 37.5
Not sure if remembered event happened or was a
dream 12.6 54.6 12.5 46.3 87.5 62.5
Being approached by people one doesn't know
who call one by a different name 12.2 52.4 4.1 8.8 12.5 12.5
Feeling as though one were two different people 11.5 47.0 11.8 18.8 25.0 25.0
So involved in fantasy that it seems real 10.0 44.5 10.9 23.8 62.5 25.0
Driving a car and realizing one doesn't remember
part of the trip 9.0 47.8 7.5 37.5 62.5 50.0
Not remembering important events in one's life 8.8 37.9 9.5 16.3 37.5 12.5
Being in a familiar place but finding it unfamiliar 8.6 40.0 8.2 15.0 37.5 25.0
Being accused of lying when one is telling the
truth 7.3 40.8 6.0 7.5 25.0 0.0
Finding notes or drawings that one must have
done but doesn't remember doing 6.7 34.0 6.3 13.8 37.5 25.0
Seeing oneself as if looking at another person 5.3 28.6 4.3 6.3 25.0 0.0
Hearing voices inside one's head 5.3 26.0 7.3 3.8 25.0 0.0
Not recognizing friends or family members 5.1 25.8 4.6 12.5 25.0 12.5
Other people and objects do not seem real 4.9 26.3 4.1 7.5 25.0 12.5
Looking at the world through a fog 4.7 26.3 4.0 7.5 12.5 12.5
Finding unfamiliar things among one's belongings 4.5 22.1 4.1 11.3 12.5 12.5
Feeling as though one's body is not one's own 3.9 22.7 3.6 2.5 12.5 0.0
Finding oneself in a place but unaware of how
one got there 2.8 18.8 2.0 16.3 37.5 12.5
Finding oneself dressed in clothes one doesn't
remember putting on 1.9 14.6 1.4 11.3 12.5 12.5
Not recognizing one's reflection in a mirror 1.8 13.6 1.2 18.8 25.0 25.0
(N = 8)
Rubber Body Illusion 
Experiment
Dissociative Experience Scale Scores in the General Population in the 
City of Winnipeg, Canada
(N = 1,055) 
Item
Figure 17: DES score comparison. Orange (darker) coloured fields are scores that are 20% or more 
above the mean values from DES scores from the city of Winnipeg, Canada (N=1055).
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6 Discussion
For the swaying condition, an interesting effect 
emerged from the data: some subjects try to syn-
chronize themselves with the virtual body in 
asynchronous condition. So we think that it is 
possible that the subjects have more illusions
when they concentrate them to be synchronous 
with the subject, than in the synchronous condi-
tion where they have nothing to do to be syn-
chronous with the subject! That is probably why 
the results for the swaying condition are in-
versed compared to the stroke condition.  One 
subject reported in the “free comments” section 
of the questionnaire, that he had the impression 
of seeing his body, but just delayed in time. For 
this subject the illusion was, as a matter of fact, 
present in the asynchronous condition. Another 
subject reported for this same condition (B2) 
that, in effect, he felt a tendency of “wanting to 
compensate” between the movements on screen 
and his own.
As we had only 8 subjects due to the limited 
time frame of the study, we did not find any 
general significant result for the shift difference 
measurement as we expected. But the results ob-
tained tends to show that increasing the number 
of subjects, thus diminishing the standard devia-
tion, should probably yield significant results.
However we found a significant anterior shift 
during the synchronous stroking condition, rep-
licating results obtained in Bigna Lenggenhager 
experiment.
Another interesting result is the lateral shift ob-
tained in the control condition and during ex-
periments. Concerning the shift obtained during 
the control condition, other VR experiments
about homing demonstrated the same under-
shoot pattern [14]. However the more interest-
ing is the right shift obtained during the experi-
ments. This may be due to the fact that subjects 
were all right-handed or due to a right orienta-
tion of the virtual character (less probable); 
however this cannot be due to undershoot be-
cause of the balanced left and right displace-
ment. As we could not find any clear explana-
tion, this should be further studied next experi-
ments.   
If we compare our shift results with the ques-
tionnaire, it seems that our hypothesis about the 
illusion is not false. The subjects felt, in some 
aspect, kind of an association with the virtual 
body. But this feeling was more on technical 
questions as the one that “the stroking was in 
the same place on his back and on the virtual 
body’s back” or as “the swaying of the virtual 
character was the same as his swaying”, rather 
than that the subject felt the actual illusion of a 
real association of his body with the virtual char-
acter. However, some questions about the body 
illusion show a slight difference, and associating 
it with our conclusion about the shift result, it is 
possible that an improved setup of our experi-
ments and a higher number of subjects might 
yield some significant results for the body illu-
sion. At least we can say that we do observe a 
clear trend, but which unfortunately is not sig-
nificant.
We think that for this experiment the image of 
the virtual body was really missing of details that 
could have helped the subjects to identify him-
self to his virtual body. For example, the virtual 
character was not always well scaled to the sub-
ject’s size, resulting in distortions in the virtual 
body and its movements (trouble with position 
of head and shoulders). Moreover, we some-
times had a short delay (due to the computer)
between the swaying of the subject and the 
swaying of the virtual body in the synchronous
condition. Furthermore, the projection of the 
body was not always on the right height for 
some subjects in the asynchronous condition, 
since for this condition the image of the virtual 
body was pre-recoreded. For the stroke condi-
tions, the virtual body was not moving at all, be-
cause we could not detect the sensors of the 
subject and the ones of the stroking object at the 
same time.
Further more, we decided to use a screen projec-
tion instead of virtual reality glasses because the 
representation of the virtual body looked really 
better and the size of the body was better re-
spected when looking on the screen projection 
even if there would have been other advantages 
with the glasses. For example, we think that the 
presence of surrounding steady objects such as 
the detector bars of the tracking cage, or even 
the walls might serve as a reference for the sub-
ject. This reference effect might compete with 
the self-identification effect to the virtual charac-
ter and thus could influence on the measured 
shift. However, it seems that when subjects are 
well concentrated on the screen, these factors do 
not interfere too much. Also, using the screen, 
only a “projected 3-dimension” could be 
achieved which can be inhibiting for the effect 
we were looking for; but the VR-glasses to our 
disposal also only delivered 2d images.
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Improving all these details could lead to truly
better projection of the virtual body and could 
help the subject to have a more intense body il-
lusion.
Concerning the questionnaires, they were filled 
out only after the four conditions and not after 
each experiment individually, which may have 
resulted in a loss of the subject’s memory ac-
cording to his feelings or in mixing up the feel-
ings present during the four conditions. Yet, 
since the questionnaires enquire on cognitive 
and self-sensational effects, this was a piece of 
information that we tried to obstruct at any 
price, as giving the questionnaires at the end of 
each part might have provoked a loss in the sub-
ject’s naivety. 
7 Conclusion
In this study we try to reproduce the rubber 
hand illusion to the whole body. This has been 
done with a quite complex experimental setup 
using a system of sensors for virtual reality and 
electro-dermal activity system.
We speculate that if we stroke the back of the 
subject while the subject sees a representation of 
himself, as it was done for the rubber hand illu-
sion, the subject would also experience the illu-
sion but for the whole body. We also speculate 
that this type of illusion could appear when the 
subject sways his own body and sees a virtual 
projection of himself.
The results were not completely significant but 
we had some trouble with the virtual body which 
did not look sufficiently realistic. Furthermore, 
we did not test enough subjects (due to the lim-
ited time frame for this study) in order to have a 
statistically relevant sample. For this reason, we 
conclude that this experiment is promising to 
give significant results with an improved and re-
vised setup.
For further research, improving this experiment 
with a mechanical stroking machine could help 
to set the time delay so the range is for example 
[-100ms; 100ms] and the strokes sometimes 
happen before and sometimes after.  It could be 
more efficient for asynchronicity.
Additionally it could also be interesting to have 
schizophrenia patients as subjects. The schizo-
phrenic patients are already known for having 
“problems with self”, it could be then interesting 
to conduct the same experience with such kind
of subjects. Same for Cannabis addicts subjects 
which are also known for having self “alien-
ation” (a lot of articles recently discussed about 
schizophrenia and cannabis relation [15]). We 
think these topics could be interesting for fur-
ther experiments.
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